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a b s t r a c t
Limitedmigration results in kin selective pressure on helping behaviors under a wide range of ecological,
demographic and life-history situations. However, such genetically determined altruistic helping can
evolve only when migration is not too strong and group size is not too large. Cultural inheritance
of helping behaviors may allow altruistic helping to evolve in groups of larger size because cultural
transmission has the potential to markedly decrease the variance within groups and augment the
variance between groups. Here, we study the co-evolution of culturally inherited altruistic helping
behaviors and two alternative cultural transmission rules for such behaviors. We find that conformist
transmission, where individuals within groups tend to copy prevalent cultural variants (e.g., beliefs or
values), has a strong adverse effect on the evolution of culturally inherited helping traits. This finding is
at variance with the commonly held view that conformist transmission is a crucial factor favoring the
evolution of altruistic helping in humans. By contrast, we find that under one-to-many transmission,
where individuals within groups tend to copy a “leader” (or teacher), altruistic helping can evolve in
groups of any size, although the cultural transmission rule itself hitchhikes rather weakly with a selected
helping trait. Our results suggest that culturally determined helping behaviors are more likely to be
driven by “leaders” than by popularity, but the emergence and stability of the cultural transmission rules
themselves should be driven by some extrinsic factors.
Published by Elsevier Inc.1. Introduction
Identifying all the conditions conducive to the emergence
and stability of helping behaviors remains one of the challenges
of behavioral ecology (Bshary and Bergmuller, 2007). When a
population consists of groups that are of small size and migration
is limited between groups, group members tend to be genetically
related. This occurs because individuals within groups are more
likely to have inherited (through the joint action of genetic drift
and limited migration) identical alleles from a common ancestor
than individuals sampled at random from the population. Such
genetic relatedness between group members can account for the
evolution of altruistic helping by kin selection under a wide
range of biological scenarios in spatially subdivided populations
(e.g., Hamilton (1971), Eshel (1972), Hamilton (1975), Aoki (1982),
Rogers (1990), Taylor (1992), van Baalen and Rand (1998), Taylor
and Irwin (2000), Le Galliard et al. (2003), Axelrod et al. (2004),
Gardner andWest (2006), Lehmann et al. (2006), Lehmann (2006),
Jansen and van Baalen (2006), Ohtsuki et al. (2006), Grafen (2007a),∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: lehmann@stanford.edu (L. Lehmann),
marc@charles.stanford.edu (M.W. Feldman).
0040-5809/$ – see front matter Published by Elsevier Inc.
doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2008.02.004Grafen (2007b), Rousset and Roze (2007) and Lions and van Baalen
(2008)). But genetic relatedness between interacting individuals
decreases as group size increases. This occurs because the rate at
which different individuals within groups inherit an allele from
the same ancestor decreases as group size increases. Relatedness
also decreases as the migration rate increases, because migration
homogenizes the genetic composition of populations. With large
group size or a high migration rate or both, the genetic variance
within groups will be high and the variance between groups low
(i.e., low relatedness), so that the evolution of genetically-inherited
altruistic helping becomes unlikely.
Behaviors can also be inherited culturally. It has been suggested
that the cultural inheritance of altruistic helping could be more
favorable to its evolution in groups of large size than genetic
inheritance (Boyd and Richerson, 1982; Fehr et al., 2002; Henrich,
2004; Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Boyd and Richerson, 2005).
When a trait is inherited culturally, its transmission between
the individuals in a population need not be strictly vertical but
may also be oblique or horizontal (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman,
1981). For instance, birds learn song dialects from neighboring
individuals (Bonner, 1980), chimpanzees acquire the skills of
“termiting” with tools by imitating group-mates (Goodall, 1966),
and humans are able to learn from unrelated individuals present
and from past generations (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981;
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non-vertical cultural transmission comes the potential to pass on
complex behavioral traits to biologically unrelated individuals.
This may increase the coalescence rate of homologous cultural
variants within groups, which, in turn, increases the cultural
relatedness between group members relative to the relatedness
under genetic transmission.
The distribution of cultural variants within and between groups
depends on how individuals assimilate variants from other indi-
viduals in their group or the population (i.e., social learning). Each
individual is characterized by a particular assimilation rule, which
determines howhe/she learns from other individuals. Assimilation
rules can be divided into two non-mutually exclusive categories.
First, an assimilation rule may depend on the frequency of cul-
tural variantswithin a group. For instance, individualsmay express
preferences for common (conformist transmission) or to minority
(contrariness) variants. Individualsmay also have preferences for a
partial consensus, thereby adopting variants in a manner to main-
tain a polymorphism in the group (Lumsden andWilson, 1980, Fig-
ure 2). Conformist transmission, where individuals tend to adopt
common variants and increase the frequency of these variants, has
been proposed as the primary assimilation rule allowing high cul-
tural relatedness to be maintained between groupmembers (Hen-
rich and Boyd, 2001; Henrich, 2004), and favoring the evolution
of culturally-inherited altruistic helping in large groups (Boyd and
Richerson, 1982; Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Boyd and Richerson,
2005).
Second, an assimilation rule may be independent of the
frequency of cultural variants in the group or the population. In this
case individuals assimilate cultural variants fromother individuals,
possibly according to the class or status of the exemplar individual
(such as sex, age, wealth, prestige, etc.), so that one or several
particular individuals may play a more important role than others
in the transmission process.
Provided there is no statistical association between class
and variants, cultural variants are neutral during cultural trans-
mission. This situation can lead to strong cultural drift within
groups (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1973, 1981), especially if the
variance in cultural transmission is high. A high variance in cul-
tural transmission results from individuals from different classes
contributing very differently to the cultural transmission process
(i.e., class structured populations or social hierarchies, Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman (1981, pp. 315–339)). Suppose for instance
that everybody in a group copies the cultural variant from a ran-
domly chosen leader or teacher in the group with probability τ,
while with complementary probability 1 − τ the cultural vari-
ant of another individual sampled at random in the group is
adopted (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981, chapter 3.11). Here
there are two classes of individuals: the leader and the other in-
dividuals. If groups are of large size and migration is frequent, the
probability that two individuals bear the same cultural variant is
approximatively τ2, which can be interpreted as the coefficient of
cultural relatedness between these individuals, and is independent
of group size. If τ is large, cultural relatedness can be very high in
groups of any size and under any migration rate (Lehmann et al.,
2007, in press).
Two questions concerning the evolution of culturally-inherited
helping behaviors emerge from these considerations. First, what
types of assimilation rules, frequency-dependent or frequency-
independent but class-based, are more likely to support both
the emergence and stability of altruistic helping in groups of
large size? Second, since the assimilation rules can lead to strong
assortment between helpers, and helpers may concomitantly
increase the fitness of individuals in their group, the fitness
of individuals bearing assimilation rules leading to assortment
of helpers may also increase. One might then wonder whetherthe genes determining the assimilation rules will actually co-
evolve with helping through hitchhiking? In this paper we
address these questions by studying the co-evolution between
culturally-inherited helping and two different assimilation rules
in populations subject to random group formation and horizontal
cultural transmission. We first ask whether helping can co-evolve
with a one-to-many transmission rule, where individuals within
groups tend to copy the cultural variants (e.g., beliefs or values)
of a randomly chosen leader (or teacher). Second, we ask whether
helping can co-evolve with conformist transmission. Here, we
consider frequency-dependent assimilation rules according to
which individuals comply with high frequency or low frequency
behaviors in their group, and this allows us to cover the range from
conformism to contrariness.
2. Model
2.1. Life cycle
Suppose the population consists of an infinite number of
groups, each with N adult individuals. We postulate that each
individual is haploid and that there are two loci determining
two distinct behaviors. The first locus controls the expression
of a helping behavior that is inherited culturally; we call this
the helping locus. The second locus determines the assimilation
rule of the behavior at the helping locus. This modifier locus is
envisioned here as being inherited genetically, although nothing
in the following analysis prevents an interpretation in terms of
cultural inheritance of this locus. We assume that two variants
segregate at each locus. An individual bearing a helping variant (say
A) at the helping locus expresses a behavior that results in a fitness
cost CA to him/herself but generates a fitness benefit B, which is
shared among all group members except the actor (symbols are
summarized in Table 1). By contrast, an individual bearing the
second variant (say a) at the helping locus derives the benefit from
expression of A in others but pays no cost. An individual bearing
the modifier variant M at the modifier locus will retain or change,
according to a horizontal transmission rule, its cultural variant at
the helping locus inherited from its parent. We also assume that
bearing variant M can result in some fitness cost CM. Individuals
with variant m at the modifier locus always retain the strategy
at the helping locus that they inherited from their parents (i.e,
strict vertical transmission), and suffer no fitness cost. In this two-
locus two-variant setting, four pheno-genotypes segregate in the
population (AM, Am, aM, am).
The sequence of life cycle events is the following. (1) Adult
individuals interact within groups. The survival probability of
each individual then depends on its pheno-genotype and the
pheno-genotypes of its neighbors. (2) Groups are dissolved and
individuals then mate randomly in the population producing
offspring that inherit the cultural variants from their parents, with
recombination rate r between the helping and the modifier loci.
Adults then die. (3) Juveniles form new groups of constant size
N. (4) Horizontal cultural transmission occurs according to the
pheno-genotypes of individuals within groups.
We will investigate the effect of selection on two different
forms of assimilation rule for the cultural transmission of helping
behaviors. (i) Under one-to-many transmission, all individuals
bearing variant M in a group are assumed to copy the cultural
variant at the helping locus from a randomly sampled individual
(the leader or the teacher of the group). Since the leader can
be any individual from the group, it bears the helping variant
A with probability equal to the frequency of A in the group.
Because all individuals bearing variant M in the group adopt
the cultural variant of the same leader, they will all have (after
horizontal transmission) either pheno-genotype AM, if the leader
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List of symbols
Symbol Definition
A Helping variant.
a Defector variant.
M Modifier variant resulting in non-vertical cultural transmission.
m Modifier variant resulting only in vertical cultural transmission.
CA Fitness cost of expressing the helping variant A.
B Fitness benefit generated from the expression of the helping variant A.
CM Fitness cost of expressing the modifier variant M.
α Parameter tuning the conformist effect from perfect contrariness (α→−∞) to complete conformism (α→∞). If α = 1, conformist transmission is
unbiased.
r Recombination rate.
pA Frequency of the helping variant A after reproduction.
pM Frequency of the modifier variant M after reproduction.
Pj Frequency of pheno-genotype j after reproduction.
Xj Frequency of pheno-genotype j after recombination.
N Group size.
Nj Number of individuals with pheno-genotype j in a group after cultural transmission and just before reproduction.
N?j Number of individuals with pheno-genotype j in a group just before cultural transmission.
N Vector giving the distribution of pheno-genotypes in a group after cultural transmission.
Pr(N) Probability distribution of pheno-genotypes in a group.
wiN Fitness of individual i in a group of type N.
w¯ Mean fitness in the population.Fig. 1. Probability of adopting variant A given by Eq. (1) and graphed as a function
of the frequency of A in a group. The sigmoidal curve (labeled a) corresponds to
α = 5 and describes strong biased conformist transmission. The straight line
(labeled b) corresponds to α = 1 and shows the situation where the probability of
adopting variant A is equal to the frequency of A in a group. In this case, conformist
transmission is unbiased and variant A is neutral during cultural transmission. The
mirror image of the sigmoid curve (labeled c) corresponds to α = −5 and describes
strong contrariness where individuals prefer the less common variant in a group.
bears variant A, or they will all have pheno-genotype aM, if the
leader bears variant a. (ii) Under conformist transmission, each
individual bearing variant M independently adopts one of the two
cultural variants at the helping locus according to a conformist
assimilation rule. We assume that a focal individual expressing
variant M adopts variant Awith probability
u(xA) = x
α
A
xαA + (1− xA)α
, (1)
where xA is the frequency of variant A in the focal individual’s
group and the parameter α allows us to tune the conformist
effect from perfect conformism to complete contrariness (see
Fig. 1 and Nakahashi (2007)). With negative values of the
parameter α individuals are more willing to choose the less
frequent cultural variant within their group (contrariness). When
α = 1, individuals adopt variant A with a probability equal to
its frequency in the group, that is, conformist transmission is
unbiased (Nakahashi, 2007), and variant A is neutral in this case
(i.e., no systematic change in frequency of variant A occur during
cultural transmission). When α > 1, conformist transmission is
said to be biased (Boyd and Richerson, 2005).2.2. Variant dynamics
The change in the average frequency pK of variant K (A or M) in
the population over one iteration of the life cycle can be written
according to the Price equation (Price, 1970; Frank, 1998) as
w¯∆pK = Cov[wiN, pK(iN)] + E[wiN∆pK(iN)], (2)
where pK(iN) is the frequency (0 or 1) of variant K after cultural
transmission (and before reproduction) in individual i in a group of
typeN ≡ (NAM,NAm,NaM), where Nj is the number of individuals of
pheno-genotype j in a group (since NAM+NAm+NaM+Nam = N, we
have only three degrees of freedomandwe canomitNam fromN, for
simplicity). Hence, N is a vector giving the number of individuals
with each pheno-genotype in a group after cultural transmission,
wiN denotes the fitness of individual i in a group of type N, and w¯ is
the average fitness of individuals in the population. The covariance
and the expectation in the Price equation are averages over all
individuals within a group and all group types in the population.
The first term in the Price equation represents the change in variant
frequency due to selection while the second term represents the
change in variant frequency due to other factors. In our model,
these other factors are horizontal cultural transmission within
groups at stage (4) of the life cycle.
From our assumptions, the fitness of individual i in a group of
type N is given by
wiN = 1− CApA(iN) − CMpM(iN) + BpA(−iN), (3)
where pA(−iN) denotes the average frequency of variant A in a group
of type N, but excluding individual i from the average. Substituting
Eq. (3) into Eq. (2), and noting that the change in frequency of
variant A due to horizontal cultural transmission is independent
of the fitness of the pheno-genotypes, we find that the change in
frequency pA of the helping variant in the population can bewritten
as
w¯∆pA = (−CA − CMRAM·A + BRA/A)Var[pA(iN)] + w¯E[∆pA(iN)], (4)
where Var[pA(iN)] is the variance of the frequency of variant A
among individuals across all groups in the population after cultural
transmission,
RAM·A = Cov[pM(iN), pA(iN)]Var[pA(iN)] (5)
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individual on the variant at the helping locus of that individual, and
RA/A = Cov[pA(−iN), pA(iN)]Var[pA(iN)] (6)
is the regression of the cultural variant at the helping locus
of group-mates on the variant at the helping locus of a focal
individual. Thus, RA/A can be viewed as a measure of cultural
relatedness between interacting individuals (Allison, 1991). The
term in parentheses in Eq. (4) is the gradient of selection on the
helping variant A, and consists of three terms: the direct cost CA
of bearing the helping variant A, the direct cost CM of bearing the
modifier variant M, which is weighted by the association between
variants A and M within the same individual, and the indirect
benefit B stemming from other individuals in the group that carry
A and therefore offer help, which is weighted by the association
of variant A in two different individuals from the same group. The
last term in Eq. (4) gives the change in the frequency of variant A
solely due to horizontal cultural transmission, which results from
individuals within groups expressing the modifier variant M.
According to our assumptions, variant M does not change in
frequency during horizontal cultural transmission. From Eqs. (3)
and (2), the change in frequency pM of the modifier variant M can
then be written as
w¯∆pM = (−CM − CARAM·M + BRA/M)Var[pM(iN)], (7)
where Var[pM(iN)] is the variance of the frequency of variant M
among individuals across all groups in the population after cultural
transmission,
RAM·M = Cov[pA(iN), pM(iN)]Var[pM(iN)] (8)
is the regression of the variant at the helping locus of a focal
individual on the variant at the modifier locus of that individual,
and
RA/M = Cov[pA(−iN), pM(iN)]Var[pM(iN)] (9)
is the regression of the genotype at the helping locus of group-
mates on the genotype at the modifier locus of a focal individual.
The gradient of selection on variantM also depends on three terms:
the direct cost CM to an individual bearingM, the direct cost CA to an
individual bearing A, weighted by the association between variants
A and M within the same individual, and the indirect benefit B
stemming from other individuals in the group expressing variant
A, weighted by the association of variants A and M in two different
individuals from the same group.
2.3. Group type distribution
In order to determine the evolutionary dynamics of the helping
and modifier variants, we must evaluate the regressions of variant
frequencies (RA/A, RAM·A, RA/M and RAM·M) appearing in Eqs. (4)
and (7). To that end, we need the distribution Pr(N) of group
types during the interaction stage (stage (1) of the life cycle),
which occurs right after horizontal cultural transmission. This
distribution can be expanded in terms of the distribution before
cultural transmission according to
Pr(N) =∑
N?
Pr(N | N?) Pr(N?), (10)
where Pr(N | N?) is the probability that a group of type N?
before cultural transmission becomes a group of type N after
cultural transmission, and Pr(N?) is the distribution of group
types just before cultural transmission. Different schemes of
horizontal transmission will result in different group types evenif group composition before cultural transmission is the same.
This is because Pr(N | N?) depends on the assimilation rules
expressed by the individuals in the population. In the Appendix,
we present these cultural transition kernels for one-to-many and
conformist transmissions (see Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2)). Finally, we
need the distribution of group types Pr(N?) just before cultural
transmission. From our assumption of random group formation,
this is given by the multinomial distribution
Pr(N?) = Pr(N?AM = h,N?Am = i,N?aM = j)
= N!
h!i!j!(N − h− i− j)!
× XhAMXiAmXjaM(1− XAM − XAm − XaM)N−h−i−j, (11)
where Xk is the frequency of pheno-genotype k in the popu-
lation before group formation. Recombination between pheno-
genotypes entails that
XAM = (1− r)PAM + rpApM
XAm = (1− r)PAm + rpA(1− pM)
XaM = (1− r)PaM + r(1− pA)pM, (12)
where Pk stands for the frequency of pheno-genotype k in the
population after reproduction but before recombination, while
the frequencies pA and pM of variants A and M are not changed
by recombination. When the modifier locus is envisioned to be
inherited genetically (as is done here) it is probably best to consider
free recombination (r = 1/2), because this corresponds to a
situation where the cultural variant of an individual has an equal
chance to have been inherited from its mother or from its father.
2.4. Linkage disequilibrium
The distribution of group types Pr(N) can be expressed in terms
of pheno-genotype frequencies or in terms of separate variant
frequencies by the identities: PAM = pApM+D, PAm = pA(1−pM)−D,
PaM = (1 − pA)pM − D, where D is the linkage disequilibrium after
reproduction but before recombination and cultural transmission,
and is defined by
D = PAMPam − PAmPaM (13)
(e.g., Bürger (2000) and Ewens (2004), note that D is distinct
from Cov[pA(iN), pM(iN)], which can be interpreted as the linkage
disequilibrium after cultural transmission). Hence, to ascertain the
dynamics of the frequencies pA and pM in closed form we also
need the dynamics of the linkage disequilibrium. We computed
the dynamics of the linkage disequilibrium from the dynamics of
the pheno-genotypes in the population (Eq. (A.3) in the Appendix).
With the linkage disequilibrium, we now have all the elements
necessary to determine the evolutionary dynamics of the helping
and modifier variants.
3. Results
3.1. Co-evolution of helping and one-to-many transmission
3.1.1. Helping variant
We present explicit expressions for the moments of variant A
frequency appearing in the Price equation in theAppendix (see Eqs.
(A.8)–(A.11)). When the frequency of variantM is zero, the vertical
transmission variant m is fixed in the population, and the linkage
disequilibrium D and all covariances will be zero; hence RAM·A = 0,
RA/A = 0, and E[∆pA(iN)] = 0. Then, from Eq. (4) we see that the
change in frequency of the helping variant is
w¯∆pA = −CApA(1− pA). (14)
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0) andhelping results in a direct fitness cost to the actor (herewhen
CA > 0), altruistic helping, defined sensu Hamilton (1964, 1970)
from effects on direct fitness, is counter-selected at all variant
frequencies under random group formation. This is a standard
result (Hamilton, 1975; Cohen and Eshel, 1976; Charlesworth,
1979; Uyenoyama and Feldman, 1980; Grafen, 1984), and is a
direct consequence of the fact that relatedness is zero in that case.
By contrast, whenever the transmission of the helping variant A
is not strictly vertical (pM > 0), the cultural relatedness RA/A
between group members becomes positive, and indirect benefits
affect the evolutionary dynamics. Although relatedness decreases
with increasing group size, it remains positive even when group
size becomes very large (N → ∞), when it takes the value (see
Appendix Eqs. (A.9) and (A.11))
RA/A = pA(1− pA)p
2
M
(pA − (1− r)D) (1− pA + (1− r)D) . (15)
Similarly, expression of variantM produces an association between
variant A and M in the same individual, with the result that under
large group size (N →∞, see Appendix Eqs. (A.9) and (A.10))
RAM·A = (1− r)DpM
(pA − (1− r)D) (1− pA + (1− r)D) . (16)
Although variantM causes individuals bearing variant A to interact
with each other (i.e., it generates a positive RA/A), it also decreases
the frequency of A in the population. This occurswhenever variants
A andM are associated within individuals because those bearingM
may adopt the defector variant a. From Eq. (A.8) in the appendix,
the expected change in variant frequency solely due to horizontal
cultural transmission is given by
E[∆pA(iN)] = − (1− r)D (N − 1)
N
, (17)
and is negative provided variant A is associated with variant M
(D > 0), which is likely to be the case provided the cost CM of the
modifier is not too high (see Eqs. (A.15) and (A.17)).
Inserting Eqs. (15)–(17) into Eq. (4) we find that the change in
frequency of Awhen groups are of large size (N →∞) is given by
w¯∆pA = pA(1− pA)
(
−CA + Bp2M
)
− (1− r)D (1− DB(1− r)− CA(1− pA)+ BpA) . (18)
Thus, selection may favor the helping variant A if the frequency pM
of M in the population is high enough that the right-hand side of
Eq. (18) is positive.
3.1.2. Modifier variant
When the frequency of variant A is zero, the linkage disequi-
librium D will be zero and all covariances will be zero in which
case RAM·M = 0 and RA/M = 0. Then, Eq. (7) informs us that
the change in frequency of the modifier variant is simply given
by w¯∆pM = −CMpM(1 − pM). Thus, when variant M is costly, it
is counter-selected at all variant frequencies. When the helping
variant A is introduced into the population, variants A and M be-
come positively associated in different individuals within groups.
This association is given by RA/M = (1 − r)D/[N(1 − pM)] (see
Appendix Eqs. (A.12) and (A.13)) and causes indirect selection on
the modifier variant M, which may then increase in frequency
in the population. Inserting Eqs. (A.10), (A.12) and (A.13) into
Eq. (7), we find that the change in frequency of M is given by
w¯∆pM = −CMpM(1− pM)+ (1− r)
×D
(
BpM
N
− CA
(
pM + 1− pM
N
))
. (19)Thus, selection may favor the modifier variant M if the benefit B
of helping is large enough that the right-hand side of Eq. (18) is
positive. However, the indirect selective pressure on the variant
M is rather weak because it depends on the inverse of group size
multiplied by the linkage disequilibrium D, which is usually small.
Consequently, the benefits of helping will only weakly affect the
evolutionary dynamics of the modifier variantM. In groups of very
large size (N →∞), Eq. (19) becomes
w¯∆pM = −CMpM(1− pM)− CApM(1− r)D. (20)
The modifier variant M will therefore never spread in groups of
very large size when it produces a cost (CM > 0). This is in contrast
to the helping variant A which may still be selected for in this
case (see Eq. (18)). Finally, in order to obtain the evolutionary
dynamics of the helping and modifier variants explicitly, we need
the dynamics of the linkage disequilibrium D, which unfortunately
is very complicated, and we present only special cases in the
Appendix (see Eqs. (A.15) and (A.17)).
3.1.3. Local stability
Co-evolution of the frequency pA of variant A, the frequency
pM of variant M and the linkage disequilibrium D occurs via a
dynamical system with three state variables. In order to ascertain
whether helping and horizontal transmission may invade the
population when rare, we carried out a local stability analysis of
the equilibrium point (pA = 0, pM = 0, D = 0). Standard methods
show that the three eigenvalues of the linearizeddynamical system
at this point are given by: 1−CM, 1−CA and (1−r) (1− CA − CM) /N.
Hence, if both the helping and the modifier variant produce a
cost, all eigenvalues are smaller than unity. When all eigenvalues
of a linearized dynamical system are smaller than unity at a
given point in state space, this point is locally stable, which
implies here that rare costly variants A and M cannot invade the
population. In order to establish whether a population of helpers
with horizontal transmission is immune to defection, we carried
out a local stability analysis of the equilibrium point (pM = 1,
pA = 1, D = 0). The three eigenvalues of the linearized dynamical
system at this point are given by: (1+ B− CA)/(1+ B− CA − CM),
(1−CM)/(1+B−CA−CM) and (1−r)(1+B(1−1/N))/(1+B−CA−CM).
Hence, if both the helping and the modifier variant produce a cost,
at least one eigenvalue is greater than unity, and the equilibrium
point (pA = 1, pM = 1, D = 0) is locally unstable. Thus, the vertical
transmission variant m can invade the population, which, in turn,
may allow for the invasion of the defector variant a. This local
stability analysis suggests that for the frequency of the helping
variant A to increase in frequency when rare, and achieve fixation,
the modifier variantMmust either be neutral (CM = 0) or result in
a direct benefit (CM < 0) due to extrinsic factors.
3.1.4. Dynamics
In Fig. 2we illustrate the dynamics of the frequencies of variants
A and M, and the components of the Price equations (RAM·A, RA/A,
RAM·M, RA/M and E[∆pA(iN)]) as functions of time under different
sets of parameter values. When variant A and M are initially
not rare in the population (here we used pA = pM = 0.1),
and the modifier variant M results in a fitness cost to the actor
(CM > 0), selection decreases the frequency of themodifier variant
(Fig. 2A). This induces a steady decline of the associations between
variant A in different individuals from the same group, which
ultimately drives the helping variant A to extinction, although the
dynamics go through a transient phase in which the frequency
of A first increases and then declines when the cost of bearing
the modifier is low (Fig. 2A). For the same set of parameter
values but with a neutral modifier variant (CM = 0), the helping
variant A is driven to fixation if the cost-to-benefit ratio of helping
is small (Fig. 2B), but is counter-selected if the cost-to-benefit
L. Lehmann, M.W. Feldman / Theoretical Population Biology 73 (2008) 506–516 511Fig. 2. Dynamics under “one-to-many” transmission of variants A andM, of the associations appearing in the Price equations (RAM·A , RA/A , RAM·M , RA/M) and of the within-
group cultural transmission (E[∆pA(iN)]). In all panels, the values of all associations have been multiplied by 10. The panels in the right column represents a magnification
of the panels of the left column by a factor 20. Panel A: parameter values are N = 5, r = 0.5, B = 1, CA = 0.01, CM = 0.01 and the initial conditions are pA = 0.1, pM = 0.1
and D = 0. Panel B: same parameter values as in panel A except that the modifier variant bears no cost (CM = 0). Panel C: same parameter values as in panel A except that
the cost at the helping variant is increased to CA = 0.05. Panel D: parameter values are N = 1000, B = 0.5, CA = 0.1, CM = −0.05 (i.e., modifier is beneficial), and the initial
conditions are pA = 0.01, pM = 0.01 and D = 0.ratio becomes large (Fig. 2C). In all of our numerical simulations
with a neutral modifier M, the frequency of M remained nearly
constant while variant A either invaded or was expelled from
the population. Thus, the hitchhiking effects are very small and
the associations between variants A and M in the same and in
different individuals will remain approximately constant during
the invasion or expulsion of A. Finally, when variant M results in
a direct fitness benefit (CM < 0), both helping and non-vertical
transmission can co-evolve from initially very low frequencies
(i.e., rare mutant can invade). The modifier variant M invades thepopulation first (Fig. 2D), markedly increasing the relatedness RA/A
during its sweep through the population,which then drives variant
A to fixation.
3.2. Co-evolution of helping and conformist transmission
Unfortunately, we found no analytical solutions for the con-
formist transmission model Eq. (A.2), and we were unable to carry
out the local stability analysis analytically. We therefore numer-
ically iterated the recursions for pheno-genotype frequencies to
512 L. Lehmann, M.W. Feldman / Theoretical Population Biology 73 (2008) 506–516Fig. 3. Dynamics over time under “conformist” transmission of variants A andM, of the associations appearing in the Price equations (RAM·A , RA/A , RAM·M , RA/M) and of the
within-group cultural transmission term (E[∆pA(iN)]). In all panels, the values of all associations have beenmultiplied by 10, except that the value of RAM has beenmultiplied
by 5. Panel A: parameter values are α = 5, N = 5, r = 0.5, B = 1, CA = 0.01, CM = 0 and the initial conditions are pA = 0.2, pM = 0.2 and D = 0. Panel B: same parameter
values as in panel A except that there is no conformism (α = 1, see Fig. 1). Panel C: same parameter values as in panel A except that there is contrariness (α = −5) and the
initial conditions are pA = 0.01, pM = 0.01 and D = 0. Panel D: same parameter values as in panel A except that the modifier results in a direct benefit CM = −0.05.study the dynamics of this model Eq. (A.3). In Fig. 3 we illustrate
the dynamics of the frequencies of the helping and modifier vari-
ants, and the components of the Price equations (RAM·A, RA/A, RAM·M,
RA/M and E[∆pA(iN)]) as functions of time under different sets of pa-
rameter values for the conformist transmission rule. If the mod-
ifier variant M results in a fitness cost or is neutral (CM ≥ 0), it
causes the helping variant A to be expelled from the population
under biased conformism (α = 5), even with high initial frequen-
cies of variants A and M (by high initial frequencies of a variant
K we mean here and below pK  0 and pK < 0.5, and we usedpA = pM = 0.2 in Fig. 3A). The helping variant A is counter-selected
because individuals bearing variant M adopt the most frequent
variant in their group, namely the defector a. This results in strong
pressure against A causing the within-group cultural transmission
term of the Price equation (E[∆pA(iN)]) to be much more negative
under conformist transmission than under one-to-many transmis-
sion (compare the right panels of Figs. 2B and 3A). It is this strong
negative value of the cultural transmission term (E[∆pA(iN)]) that
drives variant A out of the population, even if cultural relatedness
is initially high. Hence, while the stochastic fluctuations of variant
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edness under conformist transmission, even if the frequency of A
is initially rare, it is the negative term E[∆pA(iN)] that prevents the
evolution of costly variant Awhen rare.
Moreover, conformist transmission results in negative statisti-
cal associations of the helping and modifier variants within and
between individuals (RAM·M < 0 and RA/M < 0, Fig. 3A) be-
cause individuals bearing variant M adopt primarily the defector
variant a when pA < 0.5. That conformist transmission has an
adverse affect on the evolution of helping can best be seen by tun-
ing the parameter α that determines the conformist bias (Fig. 1).
Under unbiased conformism (α = 1), individuals copy the strate-
gies with a probability equal to their frequencies in groups, and the
helping variant A actually evolves for a set of parameter values un-
der which it is counter-selected with biased conformist transmis-
sion (Fig. 3B). Note that when α = 1 the transmission mode has
some similarity with one-to-many transmission because in both
cases individuals adopt strategies according to their frequency in
groups in an unbiased way (i.e., the leader will carry variant Awith
a probability equal to its frequency in the group). The difference
is that under one-to-many transmission all individuals with vari-
ant M adopt the helping variant from the same individual, while
with unbiased conformist transmission, each individual carrying
M chooses independently, which results in a lower relatedness be-
tween group members. A large number of repeated rounds of hor-
izontal transmission with α = 1 would, in fact, be equivalent to
the one-to-many transmission rule, and result in the fixation of a
helping variant at the level of the group in a single round of hor-
izontal transmission. If there is contrariness (α = −5), variant A
increases very rapidly at first but is counter-selected later because
the modifier variant M is outrun by the vertical transmission vari-
antm (Fig. 3C). This occurs because under contrariness, relatedness
decreases very rapidly while the linkage disequilibrium builds up,
resulting in indirect selection pressure on variantM, which is then
counter-selected. Finally, when conformist transmission results in
a direct benefit through some extrinsic factor (CM < 0), variant
M increases and causes the frequency of A to decline very rapidly
(Fig. 3D).
4. Discussion
Cultural inheritance of helping behaviors has been proposed
to be more favorable to the evolution of altruistic helping in
groups of large size than genetic inheritance (Boyd and Richerson,
1982; Fehr et al., 2002; Henrich, 2004; Richerson and Boyd,
2005; Boyd and Richerson, 2005). Horizontal and oblique cultural
transmission can markedly increase similarities within groups
and differences between groups relative to those stemming
from genetic transmission. This occurs because under cultural
transmission many individuals can easily adopt the variants from
only a few individuals, which can produce high associations
between the cultural variants carried by individuals within groups
(i.e., high cultural inbreeding sensu (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman,
1981, p. 352) or cultural relatedness sensu (Allison, 1991)),
thereby increasing the selective pressure on helping behaviors.
In this paper we studied the co-evolution of culturally-inherited
helping traits and two assimilation rules under horizontal cultural
transmission: one that is frequency-independent but class-based
(one-to-many transmission) and one that is frequency-dependent
(conformist transmission). We assumed a panmictic population in
order to rule out any effect of limited migration, which inevitably
leads to identity by descent within groups, and would by itself
increase the cultural and/or the genetic relatedness between group
members. In the absence of cultural transmission, altruistic helping
can never evolve in our population setting Eq. (14), and we asked
whether natural selection can drive the evolution of an inheritancesystem that is more susceptible to co-evolution with altruistic
helping.
Our models show that altruistic helping can evolve in groups
of very large size when helping is inherited culturally rather
than genetically. For instance, under a one-to-many assimilation
rule, the cultural relatedness remains positive in groups of
large size even under complete migration. This illustrates that
cultural inheritance can produce positive relatedness coefficients
between group members, which are independent of group size
and migration rate (Eq. (15), see also Lehmann et al. (2007,
in press)). Under cultural inheritance, it is no longer the ecological
or demographic processes of the population that primarily
determine the relatedness between interacting individuals at the
helping locus, but the specificities of the individual assimilation
rules, which can involve vertical, horizontal and oblique cultural
transmissions. Our one-to-many transmission model is only one
example of a more general situation where the assimilation
rule of cultural variants is frequency-independent but class-
or status-based (and there is no association between variants
and class), which can result in high cultural relatedness at all
variant frequencies because some individuals contribute more
than others to the transmission process (see also Cavalli-Sforza
and Feldman (1981, pp. 315–339)). For instance, there is empirical
evidence that individuals may copy others with higher wealth or
prestige (Rogers, 1995), which are particular examples of class
structured population. Here, we can make a direct analogy with
systems of genetic inheritance, where class structured populations
generally result in a higher variance in reproductive success,
leading to increased local genetic drift (Rousset, 2004), which
favors the evolution of altruistic helping.
While a rare helping variant can invade a population of
defectors under one-to-many transmission and become fixed
when it is common (Fig. 2B), the same helping variant is
counter-selected under biased conformist transmission, when
everything else is held constant (compare Figs. 2B with 3A).
Because conformist transmission causes individuals to copy the
most frequent variant in a group, a rare helping variant is strongly
disfavored under this transmission rule. As can be seen from
Fig. 3A, even at high initial frequencies (here pA = 0.2; by
high initial frequencies we mean pA  0 and pA < 0.5) and
with low cost-to-benefit ratio, the helping variant A is ousted
from the population. Fig. 3A shows that while biased conformist
transmission may result in high relatedness RA/A between group
members, it creates a strong negative change in the frequency
of the helping variant due to within-group cultural transmission
(E[∆pA(iN)] < 0 in Eq. (4)). This by-product of conformist
transmission causes negative biased transmission and forces
the costly helping variant to be expelled from the population.
We emphasize here that the stochastic fluctuations of variant
frequencies caused by finite group size entail that a helping
variant can be locally common while globally rare (which can
generate high RA/A even if the frequency of A is globally low).
Consequently, our model offers in principle a stronger case for
the evolution of helping through biased conformist transmission
than the previous ones (Boyd and Richerson, 1982; Henrich and
Boyd, 2001), which assumed limited migration but infinite group
size, a situation that cannot produce a positive cultural relatedness
at low variant frequencies through random sampling of variant
frequencies. But even when stochastic fluctuations in variant
frequencies do occur, it follows from our result that the within-
group transmission termof the Price equation (E[∆pA(iN)] in Eq. (4))
can have a very strong adverse effect on the evolution of culturally-
inherited helping behaviors. On the other hand, when cultural
transmission occurs by unbiased conformist transmission (α = 1
in Fig. 1), the negative selective pressure on a rare helping variant
is relaxed and relatedness among group members increases. This
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population (Fig. 3B).While our results show that biased conformist
transmission does not facilitate the spread of costly behaviors
unless they have already reached a very high frequency in the
population (pA > 0.5) due to some extrinsic factors, they do not
imply that all rare variants would be eliminated by conformist
transmission. Indeed, if variant A resulted in some direct benefit
(CA < 0), Eq. (4) shows that A could invade when rare because one
can always find a value of CA that overcomes the adverse effect of
biased cultural transmission as measured by E[∆pA(iN)].
Our results illustrate that a frequency-dependent assimilation
rule such as biased conformist transmission,which is often invoked
in discussions on the evolution of helping in humans (Boyd and
Richerson, 1982; Henrich and Boyd, 2001; Richerson and Boyd,
2005; Henrich, 2004), is unlikely to promote the evolution of
altruistic helping in situations where it is otherwise difficult
to explain, that is, in populations of large size when the trait
is initially rare. On the other hand, a frequency-dependent
assimilation rule such as “contrariness transmission” favors the
helping variant when rare but opposes its fixation. This all
suggests that frequency-dependent assimilation rules are unlikely
to help to explain both the emergence and stability of culturally-
inherited helping traits, unless one postulates a combination of
the conformist and contrariness effects. By contrast, frequency-
independent assimilation rules based on classes or stratification
can result in high cultural relatedness at all variant frequencies,
while simultaneously having only minimal impact on the within-
group transmission rate (here E[∆pA(iN)]). These assimilation rules
allow for both the emergence of costly helping when rare and its
stability when common.
In our models, the helping variant A cannot evolve without the
modifier variantM, but themodifier variant hitchhikes onlyweakly
with the helping variant. Further, helping and the assimilation
rules also cannot co-evolve when both variants are initially rare,
unless there is direct selection on the modifier (see section
“Local stability”). This suggests that the benefits of helping are
unlikely to be the main forces causing the evolution of non-
vertical transmission in panmictic populations (i.e., random group
formation). The evolution of a psychological propensity to copy the
leader or themajority is thus not explained directly by ourmodels.
But oblique or horizontal transmission may evolve through other
factors such as temporally varying environments (Wakano et al.,
2004; Wakano and Aoki, 2006). Once social learning is introduced
in the population through extrinsic factors, that result in direct
selection on themodifier variantM, the flow of information within
groups becomes more skewed than under genetic transmission,
which may then drive the increase of a rare costly helping variant
in groups of any size (see section “Local stability”). Although we
assumed a panmictic population, different demographic regimes
might result in different co-evolutionary dynamics between
helping and cultural transmission. For instance, under both limited
migration and finite group size, linkage disequilibrium due to
identity by descent develops between loci in the same and in
different individuals, possibly increasing indirect selection on a
modifier variant.
A distinctive feature of cultural transmission relative to genetic
transmission of helping behaviors is the ease with which traits
can be passed on to biologically unrelated individuals through
oblique or horizontal transmission, a process that can lead to
high cultural relatedness between individuals within groups. But
under both cultural and genetic inheritance, it is the evolutionary
dynamics that selects the equilibrium strategy(ies) for the social
game(s) played by the individuals in the population, irrespective
of individuals having any understanding or knowledge of the game
they are playing. In other words, individuals cannot individually
learn how to play the social game through trial and error, insightor deduction. Humans, however, are not immutably programmed
by their culture with fixed behaviors, but express behavioral
flexibilitywithin and across social games (Binmore, 2006; Binmore
and Swierzbinski, 2006). Indeed, humans have the ability to learn
individually (Wakano et al., 2004; Richerson and Boyd, 2005;
Borenstein et al., 2008), which suggests that it would be useful to
consider both individual and social learning of helping behaviors
jointly in future research.
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Appendix
A.1. Cultural transmission kernels
We derive here the distribution of group type after cultural
transmission given that the distribution of group type before
cultural transmission is given by Eq. (11). Under the one-to-
many transmission situation, all individuals bearing variant M
in a group copy the cultural variant at the helping locus of a
randomly sampled individual from their group (the leader or the
teacher of the group). If a group consists of pheno-genotype array
(N?AM = k,N?Am = i,N?aM = h − k) before cultural transmission,
the probability that the randomly chosen leader bears variant A
is (k + i)/N. When this event occurs, the group becomes of type
(NAM = h,NAm = i,NaM = 0) after cultural transmission. With
complementary probability 1 − (k + i)/N the randomly chosen
leader bears variant a, in which case the group becomes of type
(NAM = 0,NAm = i,NaM = h) after cultural transmission. With this,
the group type distribution after cultural transmission is
Pr(NAM = h,NAm = i,NaM = j)
=

h∑
k=0
k+ i
N
Pr(N?AM = k,N?Am = i,N?aM = h− k)
for h > 0 and j = 0
j∑
k=0
N − (k+ i)
N
Pr(N?AM = k,N?Am = i,N?aM = j− k)
for h = 0 and j > 0
Pr(N?AM = 0,N?Am = i,N?aM = 0)
for h = 0 and j = 0,
(A.1)
which satisfies
∑N
h=0
∑N−h
i=0
∑N−h−i
j=0 Pr(NAM = h,NAm = i,NaM = j) =
1.
Under conformist transmission, each individual bearing variant
M independently copies the cultural variant of an individual in its
group. Hence, the probability that h individuals bearing variant
M, among a total number of h + j such individuals, have adopted
variant A will be obtained from the Binomial distribution. The
distribution of group types can then be written as
Pr(NAM = h,NAm = i,NaM = j)
=
h+j∑
k=0
(h+ j)!
h!j! u(x
?
A)
h(1− u(x?A))j
× Pr(N?AM = k,N?Am = i,N?aM = h+ j− k), (A.2)
where u(x?A) is the conformist transmission function Eq. (1), which
depends on the frequency x?A = (k + i)/N of variant A in a group
before cultural transmission.
A.2. Genotype dynamics
In order to evaluate the components of the Price equations
explicitly, we need expressions over time for the frequencies of
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frequency of pheno-genotype k can be written as
P′k =
1
w¯
∑
N
fk(N)wk(N) Pr(N), (A.3)
where the prime denotes the next generation, fk(N) is the
frequency of pheno-genotype k in a group of type N and wk(N) is
its corresponding fitness. The frequencies of the pheno-genotypes,
conditional on group type, are given by
fAM(NAM = h,NAm = i,NaM = j) = h
N
fAm(NAM = h,NAm = i,NaM = j) = i
N
faM(NAM = h,NAm = i,NaM = j) = j
N
fam(NAM = h,NAm = i,NaM = j) = N − h− i− j
N
, (A.4)
and the fitness functions, corresponding to Eq. (3), are given by
wAM(NAM = h,NAm = i,NaM = j) = 1− CA − CM + B
(
h+ i− 1
N − 1
)
wAm(NAM = h,NAm = i,NaM = j) = 1− CA + B
(
h+ i− 1
N − 1
)
waM(NAM = h,NAm = i,NaM = j) = 1− CM + B
(
h+ i
N − 1
)
wam(NAM = h,NAm = i,NaM = j) = 1+ B
(
h+ i
N − 1
)
. (A.5)
A.3. Expectations, variances and covariances
The expectation, variances and covariances appearing in Eqs.
(4) and (7) can be expressed in terms of moments of gene fre-
quencies as E[∆pA(iN)] = E[pA(iN)] − pA, Var[pA(iN)] = E[pA(iN)](1 −
E[pA(iN)]) and Cov[pA(iN), pM(iN)] = E[pA(iN)pM(iN)]− E[pA(iN)]E[pM(iN)].
Because E[pA(−iN)] = E[pA(iN)], we also have Cov[pA(iN), pA(−iN)] =
E[pA(iN)pA(−iN)]−E[pA(iN)]2 andCov[pM(iN), pA(−iN)] = E[pM(iN)pA(−iN)]−
E[pM(iN)]E[pA(iN)]. The expectations of products of gene frequencies
appearing in these formulae are taken over the group type distri-
bution Eq. (10), and can be expressed as
E[pA(iN)] =
N∑
h=0
N−h∑
i=0
N−h−i∑
j=0
(h+ i)
N
Pr(NAM = h,NAm = i,NaM = j)
E[pM(iN)] =
N∑
h=0
N−h∑
i=0
N−h−i∑
j=0
(h+ j)
N
Pr(NAM = h,NAm = i,NaM = j)
E[pA(iN)pM(iN)] =
N∑
h=0
N−h∑
i=0
N−h−i∑
j=0
h
N
Pr(NAM = h,NAm = i,NaM = j)
E[pA(iN)pA(−iN)] =
N∑
h=0
N−h∑
i=0
N−h−i∑
j=0
(h+ i) (h+ i− 1)
N(N − 1)
× Pr(NAM = h,NAm = i,NaM = j)
E[pM(iN)pA(−iN)] =
N∑
h=0
N−h∑
i=0
N−h−i∑
j=0
h (h− 1+ i)+ j (h+ i)
N(N − 1)
× Pr(NAM = h,NAm = i,NaM = j), (A.6)
where the first term in the ratio of the last equation accounts
for the case where a randomly sampled individual carries pheno-
genotype AM (probability h/N), in which case another randomly
sampled individual (without replacement) carries variant A with
probability (h− 1+ i) /(N − 1), while the second term accounts
for the case where a randomly sampled individual carries pheno-
genotype aM (probability j/N), in which case another randomlysampled individual (without replacement) carries variant A with
probability (h+ i) /(N − 1).
The expectations Eq. (A.6) were calculated either analytically
or numerically by using Mathematica (Wolfram, 2003). Using
the multinomial distribution as the group type distribution after
cultural transmission (so that Pr(N) = Pr(N?), see Eqs. (10)
and (11)), we recover: E[pA(iN)] = pA, E[pM(iN)] = pM,
E[pA(iN)pM(iN)] = XAM, E[pA(iN)pA(−iN)] = p2A, E[pM(iN)pA(−iN)] =
pApM. Hence, all associations between genes in two different
individuals will be zero in this case (i.e., Cov[pA(iN), pA(−iN)] = 0
and Cov[pM(iN), pA(−iN)] = 0 implying that RA/A = 0 and RA/M =
0). Using Eq. (A.2) as the group type distribution after cultural
transmission, we calculated numerically the expectations for the
conformist transmission model. Using Eq. (A.1) as the group type
distribution after cultural transmission, we evaluated analytically
the expectations for one-to-many transmission. We find for the
latter case that the frequency of variant A in the population after
horizontal cultural transmission is given by
E[pA(iN)] = pA − (1− r)D
(
N − 1
N
)
, (A.7)
where pA is the frequency of A after reproduction. Thus, the change
in frequency of variant A due solely to cultural transmission is
E[∆pA(iN)] = −(1− r)D
(
N − 1
N
)
, (A.8)
where (1 − r)D represents the linkage disequilibrium after
recombination andmigration but before cultural transmission. The
variance in the frequency of A in the population after cultural
transmission is then given by
Var[pA(iN)] =
(
pA − (1− r)D(N − 1)
N
)
×
(
1− pA + (1− r)D(N − 1)
N
)
(A.9)
and the association between variants A and M in the same
individual after cultural transmission is
Cov[pA(iN), pM(iN)] = (1− r)D
( 1
N
+
(
N − 1
N
)
pM
)
. (A.10)
The association between two A variants in different individuals
within the same group is given by
Cov[pA(iN), pA(−iN)] = pA(1− pA)pM
( 2
N
+
(
N − 2
N
)
pM
)
−
(
(1− r)D
N
)2
, (A.11)
which depends on the frequencies of the two variants in the
population as well as on the linkage disequilibrium. Since the
frequency of variant M remains unchanged by horizontal cultural
transmission (i.e., E[pM(iN)] = pM), the variance in its frequency
after cultural transmission is given directly by
Var[pM(iN)] = pM (1− pM) , (A.12)
and the association between variant A and M in two different
individuals from the same group is
Cov[pA(−iN), pM(iN)] = (1− r)DpM
N
. (A.13)
Finally, from these expressions and Eq. (3), the mean fitness in the
population is
w¯ = E[wiN]
= 1+ (B− CA) E[pA(iN)] − CME[pM(iN)]
= 1+ (B− CA)
(
pA − (1− r)D
(
N − 1
N
))
− CMpM. (A.14)
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The dynamics of the linkage disequilibrium D are complicated.
We present here two special cases for one-to-many transmission.
First, we give the value of D after one generation when its initial
value is zero. This is
D′ = pA(1− pA)pM(1− pM) (BG− CACM)
w¯2
, (A.15)
where
G = 1
N
+
(
CM
N
+ N − 2
N
)
pM + (B− CA) pA
( 1
N
+ (N − 2)
N
pM
)
,
(A.16)
which is strictly positive whenever N > 1. From these two
equations, we see that if the cost CM of the modifier is low,
the linkage disequilibrium is likely to become positive over
evolutionary time if B > CM and B > 0. Second, we give the value
of D when group size becomes very large (N → ∞) and when the
cost of the modifier is zero, this is
D′ = pM
w¯2
[
pA(1− pA)pM(1− pM)B(1+ (B− CA)pA)
+ (1− r)D (1− CA + BpA) (1+ BpA)
− (1− r)DB
(
(1− pA) pApM
(
B− CA − BpM
)
+D (2− CA + 2BpA) (1− r)− B (1− r)2 D2
)]
, (A.17)
which also suggests that the evolutionary dynamics will result in a
positive linkage disequilibrium if B > CM and B > 0.
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